Статус Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия [рус., англ.] Часть 4

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The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

  1. reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international and peace, and that in particular the nuclear-weapon States will intensify their efforts in accordance with the undertaking and aims embodied in Article VI of the Treaty;
  2. understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany continues to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany will for its part remain committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;
  3. states that no provision of the Treaty may be interpreted in such a way as to hamper the further development of European unification, especially the creation of a European Union with appropriate competence;
  4. understands that research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as well as international and multinational cooperation in this field, must not be prejudiced by the Treaty;
  5. understands that the application of the Treaty, including the implementation of safeguards, will not lead to discrimination of the nuclear industry of the Federal Republic of Germany in international competition;
  6. stresses once again in this connection the vital importance it attaches to the undertaking given by the Government of the United States and by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States will assume similar obligations.»

with declaration

«Вышеупомянутый Договор в день его вступления в силу для Федеративной Республики Германии вступает также в силу в отношении Земли Берлин, не затрагивая прав и ответственности Союзных властей и полномочий, которыми они наделены в области разоружения и демилитаризации».

«The Treaty applies in Land Berlin, taking into account the rights and responsibilities of the Allied authorities and the powers they retain in the fields of disarmament and demilitarization».

By a Note of 12 November 1975 (with reference to the declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany on ratification on the application of the Treaty to Berlin (West)):

«Concerning the application of the above-mentioned treaty to Berlin (West) the German Democratic Republic states in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement concluded on 3 September 1971 between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the French Republic that Berlin (West) is no constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and shall not be governed by it.

The statement of the Federal Republic of Germany, according to which this treaty should also be applied to Berlin (West), contradicts the Quadripartite Agreement which stipulates that treaties concerning the affairs of security and status of Berlin (West) shall not be extended to Berlin (West) by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Accordingly, the declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany cannot have any legal effect.»

The signature of the Treaty by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany was prefaced by the following:

«With reference to the note handed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Government of the United States of America in its capacity as depositary government.»

After signing the Treaty, the Ambassador handed the Secretary of State a note from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as a statement by that Government. Translations of the note and statement, provided by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, read as follows:

«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Government of the United States of America and, on the occasion and in formal connection with its signing today of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has the honour to expound its understanding of the basis of that Treaty.

«I. The Federal Government understands that

— the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty;

— the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies shall continue to be ensured by NATO or an equivalent security system;

— Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Declaration of Intent of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany;

— the Treaty shall not hamper the unification of the European States;

— the Parties to the Treaty will commence without delay the negotiations on disarmament envisaged under the Treaty, especially with regard to nuclear weapons.

«II. The Federal Government declares that

— signature of this Treaty does not imply recognition of the GDR under international law;

— therefore, no relations under international law with the GDR shall arise out of this Treaty for the Federal Republic of Germany.

«III. With respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to the verification agreement to be concluded with the IAEA, the Federal Government starts from the following assumptions:

(a) Limitation of the purpose of the Treaty

It is the purpose of the Treaty to prevent the present non-nuclear-weapon States from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The provisions of the Treaty are therefore solely designed to attain this objective. In no case shall they lead to restricting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes by non-nuclear-weapon States.

(b) Research and Development

Freedom of research and development is essential in the advancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to the Federal Republic of Germany it is beyond all doubt that the Treaty may never be interpreted or applied in such a way as to hamper or inhibit research and development in this sphere.

The Federal Government has taken note of the statement made by the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations on 15 May 1968, and, in particular, of the following remarks:

«… there is no basis for any concern that this Treaty would impose inhibitions or restrictions on the opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon states to develop their capabilities in nuclear science and technology;»

«This Treaty does not ask any country to accept a status of technological dependency or to be deprived of developments in nuclear research;»

«The whole field of nuclear science associated with electric power production…… will become more accessible under the Treaty, to all who seek to exploit it. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors, but also that advanced technology, which is still developing of fast breeder power reactors, which, in producing energy, also produce more fissionable material than they consume;»

and

«Many nations are now engaged in research in an even more advanced field of science, that of controlled thermonuclear fusion. The future developments of this science and technology may well lead to the nuclear reactor of the future, in which the fission process of uranium or plutonium is replaced by the fusion reactions of hydrogen isotopes as the source of energy. Controlled thermonuclear fusion technology will not be affected by the Treaty…»

(c) Onus of proof

In connection with paragraph 3 of Article III and with Article IV of the Treaty no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can the transfer of information, materials and equipment be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(d) Exchange of Information

Article IV requires those Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Federal Government therefore expects that any measures restricting the unhampered flow of scientific and technological information will be re-examined with a view to facilitating the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.

(e) Other nuclear explosive devices

At the present stage of technology nuclear explosive devices are those designed to release in microseconds in an uncontrollable manner a large amount of nuclear energy accompanied by shock waves, i.e. devices that can be used as nuclear weapons.

At the same time, the Federal Government holds the view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must not hamper progress in the field of developing and applying the technology of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.

(f) Safeguards and Verification Agreements

There is no incompatibility between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM. As to the safeguards provided for in its Article III, the Non-Proliferation Treaty limits itself to referring to agreements to be concluded with the IAEA, the contents of which have therefore not yet been laid down.

The safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as described in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III, can be concluded by Parties to the Treaty not only «individually» but also «together with other States». States being members of an organization the work of which is related to that of the IAEA comply with their obligation to conclude the agreement by the organization concerned concluding it with the IAEA, as also provided in Article XVI of the Statute of the IAEA and in the Agency’s safeguards system.

The obligation of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under paragraph 1 of Article III to accept safeguards outside its own territory prevails only if such Party has dominant and effective control over a nuclear facility.

In order to avoid incompatibility between the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and compliance with the provisions of the Treaty establishing EURATOM, the verification procedures must be so defined that the rights and obligations of member states and the Community remain unaffected, in accordance with the opinion rendered by the Commission under Article 103 of the Treaty establishing EURATOM.

To this end, the Commission of the European Communities will have to enter into negotiations with the IAEA.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany intends to postpone the ratification procedure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty until negotiations between the Commission and the IAEA have led to agreement.

«IV. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany reaffirms the attached Statement made by it on signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

«Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

«(1) welcomes the fact that the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has now been consolidated world-wide by treaty and points out that the Federal Republic of Germany has as early as October 1954, in the Brussels Treaty, renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and accepted relevant controls;

«(2) reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international d tente, and peace, and that it will render an important contribution towards the creation of an international community based on the security of independent nations and on the progress of mankind;

«(3) understands that the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty;

«(4) understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany shall continue to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany for its part shall remain unrestrictedly committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;

«(5) understands that Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as Declarations of Intent of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany;

«(6) states that the principles contained in the Preamble to the Treaty, and the principles of international law laid down in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which preclude any threat or use of force directed against the territorial integrity or the political independence of a State, are the indispensable prerequisite to the Treaty itself and shall apply without any restriction also in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany;

«(7) signs the Treaty in the expectation that it will encourage further agreements on the prohibition of the use and threat of force, which will serve to stabilize peace in Europe;

«(8) states that the Federal Republic of Germany, in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy, will remain free by invoking the principle of international law laid down in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to take the measures required to safeguard these interests;

«(9) signs the Treaty convinced that it will not hamper European unification;

«(10) regards the Treaty not as an end but rather a starting point for the negotiations, provided for in the Treaty itself as its natural supplement and to ensure its effective implementation, concerning disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the benefits arising for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy;

«(11) stresses that the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the international or multinational co-operation in this field must not only not be hampered but should even be furthered by the Treaty, especially as regards non-nuclear-weapon States;

«(12) notes that no incompatibility exists between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM;

«(13) understands that the agreements between the IAEA and EURATOM, as described in Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, shall be concluded on the basis of the principle of verification, and that verification shall take place in a way that does not affect the tasks of the European Atomic Energy Community in the political, scientific, economic and technical fields;

«(14) insists that, in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, the safeguards shall only be applied to source and special fissionable material and in conformity with the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials at certain strategic points. It understands that the words «source material» and «special fissionable material» used in the Treaty shall have — subject to amendments expressly accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany — the meaning laid down in the present wording of Article IX of the Statute of the IAEA;

«(15) understands that each Party to the Treaty shall decide for itself which «equipment or material» shall fall under the export provision of paragraph 2 of Article III. In so doing the Federal Republic of Germany will accept only those interpretations and definitions of the terms «equipment or material» which it has expressly approved;

«(16) reaffirms the necessity of settling the question of the costs of safeguards in a way that does not place unfair burdens on non-nuclear-weapon States;

«(17) declares that the Federal Republic of Germany does not intend to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty before an agreement in accordance with Article III of that Treaty has been concluded between EURATOM and the IAEA which both in form and substance meets the requirements of paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of this Statement and compatibility with the Treaty instituting the European Atomic Energy Community has been established;

«(18) stresses the vital importance it attaches, with a view to ensuring equal opportunities in the economic and scientific fields, to the fulfilment of the assurance given by the United States and Great Britain concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States as well will give similar assurances;

«(19) reaffirms its view that, until the conclusion of the agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM, the supply contracts concluded between EURATOM and the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall remain in force, and that, after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supply contracts should, in the interest of an unhampered exchange of information, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes, be freed from any additional political or administrative restrictions.

«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany signs today in Washington, London and Moscow, the capitals of the three Depositary Governments, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

«On this same day, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hands to the Depositary Governments — informing simultaneously the Governments of all States with which the Federal Republic of Germany maintains diplomatic relations — the text of a Note bringing the above Statement to the attention of these Governments. The Note also contains the known German interpretation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which are designed to preserve the sphere of peaceful activities and to ensure the conclusion of the verification agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM in accordance with Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.»

The instrument of ratification of the Treaty by the Federal Republic of Germany was accompanied by a declaration and a statement contained in notes from the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated May 2, 1975, which read as follows:

«Excellency:

«I have the honor to make the following declaration on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

«In connection with the deposit today of the instruments of ratification of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany sets out below in summary form the understanding on which the Federal Republic of Germany becomes a Party to the Treaty and on which it commented in its Note and in its Statement of 28 November 1969 on the occasion of signing the Treaty.

«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany

«1. reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international , and peace, and that in particular the nuclear-weapon States will intensify their efforts in accordance with the undertaking and aims embodied in Article VI of the Treaty;

«2. understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany continues to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany will for its part remain committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;

«3. states that no provision of the Treaty may be interpreted in such a way as to hamper the further development of European unification, especially the creation of a European Union with appropriate competences;

«4. understands that research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as well as international and multinational co-operation in this field, must not be prejudiced by the Treaty;

«5. understands that the application of the Treaty, including the implementation of safeguards, will not lead to discrimination of the nuclear industry of the Federal Republic of Germany in international competition;

«6. stresses once again in this connection the vital importance it attaches to the undertaking given by the Government of the United States and by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States will assume similar obligations.

«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany requests the Government of the United States of America to communicate the text of this declaration to all signatory and acceding States in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IX of the Treaty.

«Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.»

«Excellency:

«In connection with the deposit today of the instrument of ratification to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I have the honor to state on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany that with effect from the day on which the Treaty enters into force for the Federal Republic of Germany it will also apply to Berlin (West) without affecting Allied rights and responsibilities, including those relating to demilitarization.

«Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.»

 

Grenada

In a Note dated 2 September, 1975, the Government of Grenada informed the Government of the United Kingdom that it confirmed its succession to the Treaty.

By a note of September 2, 1975, provided to the United States Government by the Government of the United Kingdom, the Ministry of External Affairs of Grenada made known its succession to the Treaty.

 

Holy See

«1. This accession by the Holy See to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is inspired by its constant desire, illuminated by the teaching of universal brotherhood and of justice and peace between men and peoples contained in the Gospel message, to make its contribution to undertakings which, through disarmament as well as by other means, promote security, mutual trust and peaceful co-operation in relations between peoples. In that perspective, the Holy See judges — as is said in the official document of accession — that the aims of disarmament and easing of international tension by which the Treaty is inspired correspond with its own mission of peace, and that the Treaty, although it has its intrinsic limitations, constitutes a noteworthy step forward on the road to disarmament. In fact, in so far as the Treaty proposes to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons — while awaiting the achievement of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of complete nuclear disarmament — it has the aim of lessening the danger of terrible and total devastation which threatens all mankind, and it wishes to constitute a premise for wider agreements in the future for the promotion of a system of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

  1. In the first place, therefore, the Holy See appreciates and shares the following considerations and intentions which the States Party to the Treaty have expressed or declared in the Preamble of the Treaty:

1) the awareness of the devastation «that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples»;

2) the reaffirmation of the principle that «in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted»;

3) the intention «to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament»;

4) the intention «to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control».

  1. The Holy See is furthermore convinced that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be able to attain in full the noble objectives of security and peace which constitute the reasons for contracting it and justify the limitations to which the States Party to the Treaty submit only if it is fully executed in every clause and with all its implications. In the Holy See’s View, that actuation concerns not only the obligations to be applied immediately but also those which envisage a process of ulterior commitments. Among the latter, the Holy See considers it suitable to point out the following:
  2. a) The adoption of appropriate measures to ensure, on a basis of equality, that all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will have available to them the benefits deriving from peaceful applications of nuclear technology, in the spirit of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Preamble, and in conformity with Articles IV and V of the Treaty;
  3. b) The pursuit of negotiations in good faith «on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control», in accordance with the commitment foreseen in Article VI. The Holy See, therefore, expresses the sincere wish that these undertakings will be executed by all the Parties. In particular it declares its special interest and expresses its earnest desire:

1) that the current talks between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic armaments may soon lead to a satisfactory agreement which will make possible the cessation in an effective and lasting manner of the preoccupying arms race in that costly and murderous sector of warlike preparations, both offensive and defensive;

2) that the proposals and drafts of agreements which have been put forward for some time past by various sources, especially within the Conference of the United Nations Committee for Disarmament, and which concern complete nuclear disarmament, prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons and the limitation and control of conventional armaments, as well as the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, may attain speedy and concrete results, in conformity with the repeated resolutions of the United Nations Organization and in fulfilment of the justified and anxious expectations of men and peoples of every continent.

  1. In the spirit of the considerations expressed above, which gave rise to and which accompany this accession to the Treaty, the Holy See is convinced that the attainment of the Treaty’s aims of security and peace will be all the more complete and effective according as the extent of its application is the wider and more universal.»

with declaration

«1. Настоящее присоединение Святейшего Престола к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия вызвано его неизменным стремлением — в свете содержащихся в евангелическом послании заветов вселенского братства, а также справедливости и мира между людьми и народами — к тому, чтобы внести свой собственный вклад в реализацию инициатив, которые, также путем разоружения, направлены на укрепление безопасности, взаимного доверия, мирного сотрудничества в отношениях между народами.

С учетом такой перспективы Святейший Престол считает, как об этом сказано в официальном документе о присоединении, что конечные цели разоружения и разрядки, которыми руководствуется Договор, соответствуют миссии мира, и что в своих внутренне присущих пределах этот Договор составляет значительный шаг вперед на пути к разоружению. Действительно, в той мере, в которой он ставит задачей прекратить распространение такого оружия, пока не достигнуто прекращение гонки ядерного вооружения, и пока речь идет о достижении эффективных мер, направленных на обеспечение полного разоружения в этой области, настоящий Договор призван сократить опасность ужаса полного уничтожения, которое угрожает всему человечеству, и является предпосылкой заключения новых более широких соглашений, способных развивать систему всеобщего и полного разоружения под эффективным международным контролем.

  1. Поэтому прежде всего Святейший Престол высоко оценивает и разделяет следующие соображения и намерения, которые были выражены странами-участницами Договора или заявлены в преамбуле самого Договора:

1) Осознание опустошительных последствий, «которые имела бы для всего человечества ядерная война, и вытекающей из этого необходимости приложить все усилия для предотвращения опасности возникновения такой войны и принять меры для обеспечения безопасности народов».

2) Подтверждение принципа, согласно которому «в соответствии с Уставом ООН государства воздерживаются в их международных отношениях от угрозы силой или ее применения как против территориальной неприкосновенности или политической независимости любого государства, так и каким-либо другим способом, несовместимым с целями Объединенных Наций, и что следует способствовать установлению и поддержанию мира и международной безопасности».

3) Намерение «по возможности скорее достигнуть прекращения гонки ядерных вооружений и принять эффективные меры в направлении ядерного разоружения».

4) Стремление «содействовать смягчению международной напряженности и укреплению доверия между государствами, с тем чтобы способствовать достижению прекращения производства ядерного оружия, уничтожению всех существующих его запасов и исключению ядерного оружия и средств его доставки из национальных арсеналов в соответствии с Договором о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем».

  1. Святейший Престол убежден кроме того в том, что Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия сможет полностью достичь благородных целей безопасности и мира, которые составляют основу его положений и оправдывают те ограничения, которые принимают на себя страны-участницы договора, лишь если он будет полностью исполняться в каждом его положении и на протяжении всего его действия.

По его мнению, такое исполнение касается не только обязательств по непосредственному применению, но также и обязательств, которые предполагают принятие ряда последующих обязательств, из которых Святейший Престол считает своевременным подчеркнуть следующие:

а) принятие соответствующих мер с тем, чтобы на основе равенства обеспечить всем неядерным в военном отношении странам-участницам Договора преимущества, вытекающие из мирного использования ядерной технологии, в духе абзацев 4, 5, 6 и 7 преамбулы и в соответствии со статьями IV и V самого Договора.

б) Ведение в духе доброй воли переговоров «об эффективных мерах по прекращению гонки ядерных вооружений в ближайшем будущем и ядерному разоружению, а также о Договоре о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем» в соответствии с обязательством, зафиксированным в статье VI.

Святейший Престол выражает таким образом пожелание, чтобы названные обязательства исполнялись всеми странами-участницами Договора. В частности он отмечает свою особую заинтересованность, выражая горячее пожелание, чтобы:

1) Продолжающиеся переговоры между СССР и США по ограничению стратегических вооружений могли в ближайшем будущем привести к удовлетворительной договоренности, которая могла бы эффективным и прочным образом остановить вызывающую озабоченность гонку вооружений в такой расточительной и смертоносной области военных приготовлений, как наступательное иди оборонительное оружие;

2) Предложения и проекты соглашений, которые на протяжении некоторого времени поступают с различных сторон, в частности в рамках Конференции Комитета Объединенных Наций по разоружению, и которые касаются полного ядерного разоружения, запрещения бактериологического и химического оружия, ограничения и установления контроля над обычными вооружениями, а также проект Договора о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем, могли бы привести к быстрым и конкретным результатам в соответствии с неоднократными резолюциями ООН в ответ на оправданные тревожные ожидания людей и народов всех континентов.

  1. В духе вышеизложенных соображений, которые мотивируют и сопровождают настоящее присоединение к Договору, Святейший Престол выражает убежденность, что цели безопасности и мира, которые являются целями Договора, будут осуществлены тем более полно и эффективно, чем более широким и универсальным будет его применение».

A declaration was annexed to the instrument of accession to the Treaty by the Holy See, the text of which reads as follows:

«1. This accession by the Holy See to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is inspired by its constant desire, illuminated by the teaching of universal brotherhood and of justice and peace between men and peoples contained in the Gospel message to make its contribution to undertakings which, through disarmament as well as by other means, promote security, mutual trust and peaceful co-operation in relations between peoples.

In that perspective, the Holy See judges — as is said in the official document of accession — that the aims of disarmament and easing of international tension by which the Treaty is inspired correspond with its own mission of peace, and that the Treaty, although it has its intrinsic limitations, constitutes a noteworthy step forward on the road to disarmament. In fact, in so far as the Treaty proposes to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons — while awaiting the achievement of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of complete nuclear disarmament — it has the aim of lessening the danger of terrible and total devastation which threatens all mankind, and it wishes to constitute a premise for wider agreements in the future for the promotion of a system of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

«2. In the first place, therefore, the Holy See appreciates and shares the following considerations and intentions which the States Party to the Treaty have expressed or declared in the Preamble of the Treaty:

1) The awareness of the devastation @that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples»;

2) The reaffirmation of the principle that «in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted»;

3) The intention «to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament»;

4) The intention «to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control».

«3. The Holy See is furthermore convinced that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be able to attain in full the noble objectives of security and peace which constitute the reasons for contracting it and justify the limitations to which the States Party to the Treaty submit only if it is fully executed in every clause and with all its implications.

In the Holy See’s view, that actuation concerns not only the obligations to be applied immediately but also those which envisage a process of ulterior commitments. Among the latter, the Holy See considers it suitable to point out the following:

  1. a) The adoption of appropriate measures to ensure, on a basis of equality, that all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will have available to them the benefits deriving from peaceful applications of nuclear technology, in the spirit of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Preamble, and in conformity with articles IV and V of the Treaty;
  2. b) The pursuit of negotiations in good faith «on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control», in accordance with the commitment foreseen in article VI.

The Holy See, therefore, expresses its sincere wish that these undertakings will be executed by all the Parties. In particular it declares its special interest and expresses its earnest desire:

1) That the current talks between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic armaments may soon lead to a satisfactory agreement which will make possible the cessation in an effective and lasting manner of the preoccupying arms race in that costly and murderous sector of warlike preparations, both offensive and defensive;

2) That the proposals and drafts of agreements which have been put forward for some time past by various sources, especially within the Conference of the United Nations Committee for Disarmament, and which concern complete nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons and the limitation and control of conventional armaments, as well as the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, may attain speedy and concrete results, in conformity with the repeated resolutions of the United Nations Organization and in fulfilment of the justified and anxious expectations of men and peoples of every continent.

«4. In the spirit of the considerations expressed above, which gave rise to and which accompany this accession to the Treaty, the Holy See is convinced that the attainment of the Treaty’s aims of security and peace will be all the more complete and effective according as the extent of its application is the wider and more universal.

«From the Vatican, 25 February 1971.»

 

Hungary

By a Note of 2 July 1975 (with reference to the declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany on ratification on the application of the Treaty to Berlin (West)):

«Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Part A of Annex IV of the Quadripartite Agreement dated 3 September 1971, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as well as the United States of America have engaged themselves to maintain their rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status of the Western Sectors of Berlin. Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot represent the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin in questions of security and status and, thus, neither can it extend the validity of international conventions dealing with such questions over the Western Sectors of Berlin.

Owing to the fact that the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons affects directly the questions of security and status, the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic considers the Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany aimed at the application of the Treaty on Berlin (West) contrary to the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 and, therefore, unacceptable.»

 

Indonesia

The Government of Indonesia has decided to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the conviction that it will serve as an important step towards effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Together with the Non-Aligned Countries, it is the consistent policy of the Government of Indonesia to support all efforts to achieve a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to direct all endeavours towards the exclusive peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The Indonesian Government is already party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and it has always supported draft proposals designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the present Treaty could be effective only if all countries, nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, could become party to this Treaty.

The Indonesian Government takes special note of Article III, paragraph 3, stating that the safeguards required by the Treaty shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties, or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. It is therefore the common task of all parties to this Treaty to make the relevant safeguards agreement acceptable to all.

The Government of Indonesia, further, attached great importance to the declarations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, affirming their intention to seekSecurity Council action in order to provide or supportimmediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Of utmost importance, however, is not the action after a nuclear attack has been committed but the guarantees to prevent such an attack. The Indonesian Government truest that the nuclear-weapon-States will study further this question of effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

It is in this context that the Indonesian Government feels obliged to state, further, that its decision to sign the Treaty is not to be taken in any way as a decision to ratify the Treaty. Its ratification will be considered after matters of national security, which are of deep concern to the Government and people of Indonesia, have been clarified to their satisfaction.

Заявление при подписании:

«Правительство Индонезии решило подписать Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия с уверенностью, что он будет служить важным шагом на пути эффективных действий по прекращению гонки ядерного вооружения и ядерного разоружения.

Вместе с неприсоединившимися странами Правительство Индонезии проводит последовательную политику по поддержанию всех усилий по достижению договора о всестороннем запрещении испытании ядерного оружия и направлению всех стремлений по пути использования ядерной энергии только в мирных целях. Индонезийское правительство уже является участником Договора о частичном запрещении ядерного оружия 1963 года, и оно всегда, поддерживало проект предложений, направленных на ограничение распространения ядерного оружия.

Несомненно, что настоящий Договор может быть эффективен только в том случае, если все страны, как обладающие, так и не обладающие ядерным оружием, станут участниками этого Договора.

Индонезийское правительство обращает специальное внимание на ст. III, параграф 3, в котором говорится, что гарантии, требуемые Договором, будут осуществляться таким образом, чтобы избегать препятствий для экономического или технологического развития участников Договора или международного сотрудничества в области мирной ядерной деятельности.

Поэтому общей задачей всех участников этого Договора является принятие соответствующего соглашения о гарантиях, приемлемого для всех.

Индонезийское правительство будет и в дальнейшем придавать большое значение Декларации Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Советского Союза, подтверждающей их намерение добиваться принятия Советом Безопасности действий с целью обеспечить или оказать немедленную помощь любому государству-участнику Договора, не обладающему ядерным оружием, который является жертвой акта агрессии или объектом угрозы агрессии, где может быть использовано ядерное оружие. Однако крайне важным является такое действие не после совершения ядерного нападения, а гарантии по предотвращению подобного нападения. Индонезийское правительство убеждено, что государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, будут изучать и дальше этот вопрос об эффективных мерах по обеспечению безопасности стран, не обладающих ядерным оружием.

Именно в этом свете индонезийское правительство считает необходимым также заявить, что его решение подписать Договор ни в какой мере не может рассматриваться как решение ратифицировать этот Договор. Вопрос о ратификации будет рассмотрен после того, как проблемы национальной безопасности, которые глубоко волнуют правительство и народ Индонезии, будут выяснены к их удовлетворению».

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