<*> A note, statement, declaration, or reservation, is attached to the signature or depository action.
The Argentine instrument of accession contains declarations, an unofficial translation of which reads as follows:
“1. Argentina firmly supports the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, thereby resolving the problem of assymetry or imbalance existing with regard to non-nuclear weapons countries that have renounced the possession thereof.
“2. The provisions of the NPT, which shall be the subject of a Review and Extension Conference in April 1995, must not be interpreted as impeding present cooperation between Argentina and the organs of the United Nations or the OAS, or with other UN member States signatories to the Full Safeguards Accords in effect with the IAEA, in a series of exclusively peaceful nuclear activities also fully subject to the IAEA system of international safeguards.
“3. Similarly, Argentina’s bilateral or multilateral cooperation with other Latin American States of the region must not be affected with respect to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy carried out in accordance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) and with the provisions of the NPT, it being understood that these two agreements are instruments that include the promotion of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.”
“The Government of Australia:
Supports effective international measures to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In April 1968 when the Treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons was introduced in the United Nations General Assembly, Australia supported the resolution commending the Treaty for the consideration of Governments. Is conscious of the fact that in the long run the security of the world as a whole will depend upon effective measures to control the nuclear arms race and to bring about general and complete disarmament. The Government therefore welcomes the call in Article VI of the Treaty for negotiations to achieve these ends.
Hopes that the Treaty will be effective in its operation and will lead to improved relationships and enhanced co-operation between the nations of the world, and in particular between the nations of the Asian and Pacific region.
Believes that a condition of an effective Treaty is that it should attract a necessary degree of support. Some progress in this direction has been made but the Government will nevertheless want to be assured that there is a sufficient degree of support for the Treaty.
Regards it as essential that the Treaty should not affect continuing security commitments under existing treaties of mutual security. Attaches weight to the statements by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union declaring their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide help to any non-nuclear weapons state party to the Treaty that is subject to aggression or the threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. At the same time the Government reaffirms its adherence to the principle, contained in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, of the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Notes that Article 10 of the Treaty provides that any party has the right to withdraw in circumstances that jeopardised its supreme interests.
Notes that the Treaty will in no way inhibit and is in fact designed to assist non-nuclear weapon states in their research, development and use of nuclear energy and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes either individually or collectively; nor must it discriminate against any state or states in their peaceful pursuits in nuclear activities.
Considers that the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Australia with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Treaty Article III must in no way subject Australia to treatment less favourable than is accorded to other states which, individually or collectively, conclude safeguards agreements with that agency.
Considers it essential that the inspection and safeguards arrangements should not burden research, development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; that they should not constitute an obstacle to a nation’s economic development, commercial interests and trade; and that they should be effective in ensuring that any breaches of the Treaty would be detected.
Attaches importance to a review of the IAEA safeguards system and procedures to clarify those issues of importance to Australia. Welcomes the fact that the Treaty in Articles 4 and 5 provides for international co-operation for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions; notes the assurances that under the Treaty the supply of knowledge, materials and equipment would not be denied to any party; and considers it important that no nuclear development should be prohibited except when such activities would have no other purpose than the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Will co-operate closely with other governments in seeking clarifications and understandings in relation to those matters which must be resolved before Australia could proceed to ratification, being convinced that a Treaty which was truly effective in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons would be a major contribution to the security of the world as a whole.”
By a Note of 29 August 1985 the Government of Australia stated that the above Declaration no longer accurately reflected Australia’s position: the said Declaration was not intended to have any further application after Australia’s ratification of the Treaty on 23 January 1973.
Правительство Австралии было бы признательно, если бы это заявление больше не публиковалось и не распространялось как выражение позиции Австралии применительно к Договору, так как отдельные части этого заявления больше не являются точным отражением позиции Австралии. Нота N 3887 от 29 августа 1985 года получена 2 ЕД.
At the time of its signature of the Treaty at Washington, Australia made a declaration which was not intended to have any further application after Australia’s ratification of the Treaty on January 23, 1973.
In a Note dated 16 July 1976, and received by the Government of the United Kingdom on 11 August 1976, the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas declared that it considers itself bound by the Treaty.
The Embassy of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas transmitted to the Department of State, by note dated August 13, 1976, a note of the Minister of External Affairs of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas, dated July 16, 1976, stating that the Government of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas has examined the Treaty and “declares that it considers itself bound thereby by virtue of the signature of the United Kingdom and pursuant to customary international law. I would therefore request you to consider listing The Commonwealth of The Bahamas as a party to these instruments.”
succession as of 10.07.1973
The final provisions of the instrument of accession to the Treaty by Bahrain read as follows: “The accession by the State of Bahrain to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968, shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind therewith.”
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Date of receipt of notification of succession by Bosnia and Herzegovina. The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Treaty on July 10, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification, with a declaration, on March 4, 1970.
Also deposited in Moscow and Washington on 18 September 1998
Chad signed the Treaty at Moscow on July 1, 1968.
Ceased to apply to Hong Kong wef 1 July 1997. Applies to Hong Kong (SAR) wef 1 July 1997.
“1. Китай проводит независимую самостоятельную мирную внешнюю политику, неизменно выступает за полное запрещение и окончательную ликвидацию ядерного оружия. Желая содействовать достижению этой цели, стремясь к защите международного мира, безопасности и стабильности, учитывая желания и требования большого числа безъядерных государств, Китай решил присоединиться к Договору.
- Китай проводит политику, направленную против распространения, поощрения ядерных вооружений и не занимается их распространением, а также не оказывает помощи другим странам в развитии ядерных вооружений. Китай поддерживает цели, предусмотренные в Договоре: предотвращение распространения ядерных вооружений, продвижение вперед дела сокращения ядерных вооружений, содействие международному сотрудничеству в области мирного использования ядерной энергии, и считает вышеуказанные три цели взаимосвязанными.
- Китай считает, что предотвращение распространения ядерного оружия само по себе не является целью, а есть одна из мер и шагов в процессе осуществления полного запрещения и окончательной ликвидации ядерных вооружений. Предотвращение распространения ядерного оружия и сокращение ядерных вооружений должны воздействовать друг на друга: лишь только значительный прогресс в области сокращения ядерных вооружений послужит самым эффективным путем к предотвращению их распространения, реально укрепит авторитет системы нераспространения ядерного оружия. В то же время сохранение эффективной системы нераспространения ядерных вооружений благоприятствует осуществлению их полной ликвидации. В интересах этой благородной цели полного запрещения и окончательной ликвидации ядерных вооружений государства, обладающие наибольшими ядерными арсеналами, должны надлежащим образом выполнять свои особые обязательства, первыми пойти на прекращение испытаний, производства и размещения ядерных вооружений, на значительные сокращения ядерных вооружений всех видов, дислоцированных внутри страны и за рубежом. Практический прогресс, достигнутый этими государствами во всех этих областях, создаст предпосылки для созыва широкого представительного международного совещания по сокращению ядерных вооружений с участием всех ядерных государств.
- В целях улучшения и усиления системы нераспространения ядерных вооружений, а также ускорения процесса полного запрещения и окончательной ликвидации ядерных вооружений Китай выступает за принятие следующих конкретных мер:
1) Все государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, должны взять на себя обязательство никогда и ни при каких обстоятельствах не применять первыми ядерного оружия, в этих целях заключить международное соглашение о неприменении первыми ядерного оружия.
2) Все государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, должны взять на себя обязательство не применять ядерного оружия и не прибегать к угрозе его применения в отношении безъядерных государств и безъядерных зон, для чего заключить международный правовой акт о неприменении ядерного оружия и угрозы его применения в отношении безъядерных государств и безъядерных зон.
3) Все государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, обязуются поддерживать предложения о создании безъядерных зон, уважать статус безъядерных зон и нести соответствующие обязательства.
4) Все государства, располагающие вне пределов своих стран ядерными вооружениями, должны полностью отвести их в пределы своих стран.
5) Космические державы должны прекратить гонку вооружений в космосе, развитие космических вооружений, особенно тех, которые связаны с ядерным оружием.
6) Подписание и ратификация этого договора тайваньскими властями от имени Китая соответственно 1-го июля 1968 года и 27-го января 1970 года являются незаконными и недействительными”.
On July 1, 1968, the Treaty was signed at Washington in the name of the Republic of China. An instrument of ratification of the Treaty on behalf of the Republic of China was deposited at Washington on January 27, 1970. Effective January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. The authorities on Taiwan state that they will continue to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and the United States regards them as bound by its obligations.
The instrument of accession to the Treaty by the People’s Republic of China contains statements, a translation of which reads as follows:
“I have the honor to inform you that the People’s Republic of China, in accordance with the decision made by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 29 December 1991, hereby accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty) which was opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968, and to state as follows:
“1. Pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. With a view to bringing about this objective and maintaining international peace, security and stability, and taking into consideration the aspirations and demands of the large numbers of non-nuclear-weapon countries, China has decided to accede to the Treaty.
“2. China pursues a policy of not advocating, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nor helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons. China supports the objectives set forth in the Treaty, namely, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, acceleration of nuclear disarmament and promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and believes that these three objectives are interrelated.
“3. China maintains that the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself, but a measure and step in the process towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament should be mutually complementary. Only when substantial progress is made in the field of nuclear disarmament can the proliferation of nuclear weapons be checked most effectively and the authority of the nuclear non-proliferation regime truly enhanced. At the same time, an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime is conducive to the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. To attain the lofty goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly fulfill their special obligations by taking the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing those weapons of all kinds they have deployed inside and outside their countries. Tangible progress they make in all these aspects will create conditions for the convening of a widely representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon states.
“4. China maintains that in order to improve and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and help attain the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the following specific measures should also be taken:
(1) All nuclear-weapon states undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and an international agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons should be concluded.
(2) All nuclear-weapon states undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries or nuclear-free zones, and an international legal instrument on the non-use or non-threat of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries and nuclear-free zones should be concluded.
(3) All nuclear-weapon states undertake to support the proposition of establishing nuclear weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations.
(4) All states that have nuclear weapons deployed outside their boundaries withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories.
(5) The major space powers halt their arms race in outer space and cease the development of space weapons, the nuclear-related in particular.
“5. The signing and ratification of the Treaty by the Taiwan authorities in the name of China on 1 July 1968 and 27 January 1970 respectively are illegal and null and void.”
Date of the notification of succession by Croatia. The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Treaty on July 10, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification, with a declaration, on March 4, 1970.
“Правительство Республики Куба присоединяется к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО), проявляя при этом политическую волю и демонстрируя обязательство Кубинского Государства в продвижении, укреплении и консолидации многосторонности и международных договоров в области разоружения, способствуя усилиям международного сообщества, направленным на благо укрепления мира, безопасности во всем мире, несмотря на то, что самая мощная ядерная держава сохраняет политику враждебности в отношении Кубы, не исключающей использование вооруженной силы.
Присоединяясь к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия, Правительство Республики Куба вновь подтверждает свою привязанность и уважение принципу нераспространения ядерного оружия в глобальном контексте. Следует отметить, однако, что для Кубы применение мер в этой области не является целью как таковой, а лишь шагом на пути к процессу, направленному на полную ликвидацию ядерного оружия и достижение всеобщего полного разоружения при соблюдении строгого и действенного международного контроля.
Правительство Кубы вновь заявляет о том, что оно не удовлетворено отсутствием конкретного продвижения в выполнении Статьи VI Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, обязывающей Договаривающие Стороны провести “добросовестные переговоры по действенным мерам, касающимся прекращения гонки ядерного вооружения в ближайшее время и ядерного разоружения, и по договору о всеобщем и полном разоружении при соблюдении строгого и действенного международного контроля”. Куба считает, что Государства, располагающие ядерным оружием, несут в первую очередь ответственность за выполнение этой Статьи.
Для Кубы, военные доктрины, в основе которых лежит владение ядерным оружием, являются неприемлемыми и не выдерживающими никакой критики. Ни отдельно взятой стране, ни группе стран нельзя разрешить иметь монополию на ядерное вооружение. Более того, нельзя узаконить продолжающееся в количественном и качественном отношении развитие ядерного оружия исключительно теми клубными ядерными державами, которые признает Договор. Единственной формой преодоления недостатков, порожденных Договором о нераспространении ядерного оружия, а также его избирательной и дискриминационной сущности, является выполнение цели по полной ликвидации ядерного оружия, что обеспечит безопасность в равной степени для всех.
В рамках выполнения Статьи IV Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, Правительство Республики Куба считает необходимым прекращение навязывания ограничительных односторонних мер при обмене оборудованием, материалами и научной и технологической информацией для использования в мирных целях атомной энергии, которые противоречат законному праву Государств иметь полный доступ к использованию атомной энергии в мирных целях.
Присоединяясь к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия, Правительство Республики Куба заявляет о том, что в настоящий момент на ее территории, в провинции Гуантанамо, находится морская база Соединенных Штатов. В отношении этой части кубинской территории Кубинское Государство не осуществляет надлежащей ему юрисдикции, ввиду незаконной ее оккупации Соединенными Штатами. Следовательно, Правительство Республики Куба не несет никакой ответственности по Договору в отношении указанной территории, так как неизвестно о размещении, наличии, сохранении или намерениях Соединенных Штатов о размещении ядерных средств, включая ядерное оружие, на этой незаконно окулированной кубинской территории”.
succession as of 01.01.1993
Notification of succession by the Czech Republic to the Treaty received on January 1, 1993 and effective on that date; the former Czechoslovakia signed the Treaty on July 1, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification on July 22, 1969. On December 31, 1992, at midnight, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist and was succeeded by two separate and independent states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
In a Note dated 24 March 1993, received on 5 April 1993 the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Czech Republic notified the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the following: “Upon the instruction of the Government of the Czech Republic and referring to the Declaration of the Czech National Council to All Parliaments and Nations of the World of 17 December 1992, I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency the following:
In conformity with the valid principles of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Czech Republic, as a successor State to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1 January 1993, i.e. the date of the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by multilateral international treaties to which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party on that date, including reservations and declarations to their provisions made earlier by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
From among the treaties deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland this applies also to the following:
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at London, Washington and Moscow on 1 July 1968.”
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
On 10 January 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in a public statement. States parties to the Treaty continue to express divergent views regarding the status of the DPRK under the NPT.
(Translation): Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons which threatens the security of mankind must be curbed, Egypt signed and then ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Egypt was among the first countries which called for the rapid conclusion of this Treaty, and played a constructive role in the negotiations preceding its conclusion as a complement to earlier efforts which had successfully culminated in the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.
Egypt’s commitment by virtue of the provisions of the the Non-Proliferation Treaty to refrain, in any way, from acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons shall not impair its inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty, which affirms the inalienable right of all the parties of the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The stipulation of that right in the Treaty itself is, in fact, a codification of a basic human right, which can neither be waived or impaired.
From this premise, Egypt also views with special attention the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty calling on the Parties of the Treaty who are in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Embarking on a number of construction projects of nuclear power reactors to generate electricity in order to meet its increasing energy needs so as to promote the prosperity and welfare of its people, Egypt expects from industrialized nations with a developed nuclear industry a wholehearted assistance and support. This would be in consonance with the letter and spirit of Article IV of the Treaty, in particular since Egypt has committed itself to the application of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency as regard the peaceful nuclear activities carried out within its territory, in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty.
Within the framework of the rights provided for in the Treaty for all Parties thereto in as far as the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is concerned, Egypt wishes to refer to the provisions of Article V of the Treaty, which state that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty. Though such applications pose presently certain difficulties, particularly in view of their detrimental environmental effect, Egypt nevertheless deems that this should not relieve the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty from their responsibility to promote research and development of these applications, in order to overcome all the difficulties presently involved therein.
Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two super-Powers, because of their failure to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Although it welcomes the 1972 and 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, known as SALT I and SALT II, Egypt cannot but admit that the Treaties have failed to bring about an effective cessation of the nuclear arms race, quantitatively and qualitatively, and have even permitted the development of a new generation of weapons of mass destruction.
Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapons states are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear weapons tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end.
Consequently, Egypt avails itself of this opportunity, namely the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligation whereby the nuclear arms race will be stopped and nuclear disarmament achieved. Egypt also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to exert all possible efforts so as to achieve a permanent ban of all nuclear weapon tests at an early date. This will bring to an end the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, in as much as the cut off of fissionable material for military purposes will curb the quantative increase of nuclear weapons.
As regards the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, Egypt deems that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide non-nuclear-weapon States with a genuine guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. Egypt, therefore, appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to exert their effort with a view to concluding an agreement prohibiting once and for all the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any State.
The undertaking of these steps is consistent with the letter and spirit of the basic guiding principles formulated by the General Assembly of the United Nations for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, in particular the principle of balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and stipulating that the Treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament.
Convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world shall be instrumental in enabling the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve its objectives and aims, Egypt has exerted great efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as in Africa.
In this report, Egypt expresses its great satisfaction with the United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus at its 35th session inviting the countries of the Middle East, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, to declare solemnly their support for the achievement of this objective, that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons, and to deposit their declarations of the United Nations Security Council.
In conclusion, Egypt wishes to point out that it has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons out of strong belief that this step complies with its supreme national interests, provided the Treaty succeeds in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East, which should remain completely free of nuclear weapons if it is to contribute constructively to peace, security and prosperity for its people and the world at large.
In a Note dated 14 July 1972, and received by the Government of the United Kingdom on 14 August, 1972, the Government of Fiji declared that it considers itself bound by the Treaty.
succession as of 10.10.1970
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the occasion of and in formal conjunction with its signature today of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has the honour to expound to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the following understandings on which it signs the Treaty. The Federal Government understands that: the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty; the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies shall continue to be ensured by NATO or an equivalent security system; Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Declaration of Intent of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany; the Treaty shall not hamper the unification of the European States; the Parties to the Treaty will commence without delay the negotiations on disarmament envisaged under the Treaty, especially with regard to nuclear weapons.
The Federal Government declares that: signature of this Treaty does not imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic under international law; therefore, no relations under international law with the German Democratic Republic shall arise out of this Treaty for the Federal Republic of Germany.
With respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to the verification agreement to be concluded with the IAEA, the Federal Government starts from the following assumptions:
- a) Limitation to the purpose of the Treaty.
It is the purpose of the Treaty to prevent the present non-nuclear-weapon States from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The provisions of the Treaty are therefore solely designed to attain this objective. In no case shall they lead to restricting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes by non-nuclear-weapon States.
- b) Research and Development.
Freedom of research and development is essential in the advancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to the Federal Republic of Germany it is beyond all doubt that the Treaty may never be interpreted or applied in such a way as to hamper or inhibit research and development in this sphere. The Federal Government has taken note of the statement made by the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations on 15 May 1968, and, in particular, of the following remarks:
“… there is no basis for any concern that this Treaty would impose inhibitions or restrictions on the opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon States to develop their capabilities in nuclear science and technology:” “This Treaty does not ask any country to accept a status of technological dependency or to be deprived of developments in nuclear research;” “The whole field of nuclear science associated with electric power production… will become more accessible under the Treaty to all who seek to exploit it. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors but also that advanced technology, which is still developing, of fast breeder power reactors which, in producing energy, also produce more fissionable material than they consume;” and “Many nations are now engaged in research in an even more advanced field of science, that of controlled thermo-nuclear fusion. The future developments of this science and technology may well lead to the nuclear reactor of the future, in which the fission process of uranium or plutonium is replaced by the fusion reactions of hydrogen isotopes as the source of energy. Controlled thermo-nuclear fusion technology will not be affected by the Treaty…”
- c) Onus of Proof.
In connection with paragraph 3 of Article III and with Article IV of the Treaty no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can the transfer of information, materials and equipment be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.
- d) Exchange of Information.
Article IV requires those Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Federal Government therefore expects that any measures restricting the unhampered flow of scientific and technological information will be re-examined with a view to facilitating the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.
- e) Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.
At the present stage of technology nuclear explosive devices are those designed to release in microseconds in an uncontrolled manner a large amount of nuclear energy accompanied by shock waves, ie. devices that can be used as nuclear weapons. At the same time the Federal Government holds the view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must not hamper progress in the field of developing and applying the technology of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.
- f) Safeguards and Verification Agreements.
There is no incompatibility between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM. As to the safeguards provided for in its Article III, the Non-Proliferation Treaty limits itself to referring to agreements to be concluded with the IAEA, the contents of which have therefore not yet been laid down. The safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as described in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III, can be concluded by Parties to the Treaty not only “individually” but also “together with other States”. States being members of an organization the work of which is related to that of the IAEA comply with their obligation to conclude the agreement by the organization concerned concluding it with the IAEA, as also provided in Article XVI of the Statute of the IAEA and in the Agency’s safeguards. The obligation of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under paragraph 1 of Article III to accept safeguards outside its own territory prevails only if such Party has dominant and effective control over a nuclear facility.
In order to avoid incompatibility between the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and compliance with the provisions of the Treaty establishing EURATOM, the verification procedures must be so defined that the rights and obligations of member States and the Community remain unaffected, in accordance with the opinion rendered by the Commission under Article 103 of the Treaty establishing EURATOM.
To this end, the Commission of the European Communities will have to enter into negotiations with the IAEA. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany intends to post-pone the ratification procedure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty until negotiations between the Commission and the IAEA have led to agreement.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany reaffirms the attached Statement made by it on signing the Non-Proliferation
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:
(1) welcomes the fact that the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has now been consolidated world-wide by treaty and points out that the Federal Republic of Germany has as early as October 1954, in the Brussels Treaty, renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and accepted relevant controls;
(2) reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international d tente and peace, and that it will render an important contribution towards the creation of an international community based on the security of independent nations and on the progress of mankind;
(3) understands that the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty;
(4) understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany shall continue to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany for its part shall remain unrestrictedly committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;
(5) understands that Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Declarations of Intent of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany;
(6) states that the principles contained in the Preamble to the Treaty, and the principles of international law laid down in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which preclude any threat or use of force directed against the territorial integrity or the political independence of a State, are the indispensable prerequisite to the Treaty itself and shall apply without any restriction also in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany;
(7) signs the Treaty in the expectation that it will encourage further agreements on the prohibition of the use and threat of force, which will serve to stabilize peace in Europe;
(8) states that the Federal Republic of Germany, in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy, will remain free by invoking the principle of international law laid down in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to take the measures required to safeguard these interests;
(9) signs the Treaty convinced that it will not hamper European unification;
(10) regards the Treaty not as an end but rather a starting point for the negotiations, provided for in the Treaty itself as its natural supplement and to ensure its effective implementation, concerning disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the benefits arising for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy;
(11) stresses that the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the international or multinational co-operation in this field must not only not be hampered but should even be furthered by the Treaty, especially as regards non-nuclear-weapon States;
(12) notes that no incompatibility exists between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM;
(13) understands that the agreements between the IAEA and EURATOM as described in Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, shall be concluded on the basis of the principle of verification, and that verification shall take place in a way that does not affect the tasks of of the European Atomic Energy Community in the political, scientific, economic and technical fields;
(14) insists that, in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Treaty the safeguards shall only be applied to source and special fissionable material and in conformity with the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials at certain strategic points. It understands that the words “source material” and “special fissionable material” used in the Treaty shall have – subject to amendments expressly accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany – the meaning laid down in the present wording of Article XX of the Statute of the IAEA;
(15) understands that each Party to the Treaty shall decide for itself which “equipment or material” shall fall under the export provision of paragraph 2 of Article III. In so doing the Federal Republic of Germany will accept only those interpretations and definitions of the terms “equipment or material” which it has expressly approved;
(16) reaffirms the necessity of settling the question of the costs of safeguards in a way that does not place unfair burdens on non-nuclear-weapon States;
(17) declares that the Federal Republic of Germany does not intend to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty before an agreement in accordance with Article III of that Treaty has been concluded between EURATOM and the IAEA which both in form and substance meets the requirements of paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of this Statement and compatibility with the Treaty instituting the European Atomic Energy Community has been established;
(18) stresses the vital importance it attaches with a view to ensuring equal opportunities in the economic and scientific fields, to the fulfilment of the assurance given by the United States and Great Britain concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States as well will give similar assurances;
(19) reaffirms its view that, until the conclusion of the agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM, the supply contracts concluded between EURATOM and the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall remain in force and that, after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supply contracts should, in the interest of an unhampered exchange of information, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes, be freed from any additional political or administrative restrictions.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany signs today in Washington, London and Moscow, the capitals of the three Depository Governments, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
On this same day, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hands to the Depositary Governments – informing simultaneously the Governments of all States with which the Federal Republic of Germany maintains diplomatic relations – the text of a Note bringing the above Statement to the attention of these Governments. The Note also contains the known German interpretations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which are designed to preserve the sphere of peaceful activities and to ensure the conclusion of the verification agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM in accordance with Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Declarations on ratification (translation): With effect from the day on which the Treaty Enters into force for the Federal Republic of Germany it will also apply to Berlin (West) without affecting Allied rights and responsibilities, including those relating to demilitarisation.
Further declaration on ratification (translation): In connection with the deposit today of the instruments of ratification of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany sets out below in summary form the under- standing on which the Federal Republic of Germany becomes a Party to the Treaty and on which it commented in its Note and in its Statement of 28 November 1969 on the occasion of signing the Treaty.