Exports of AHF and ACF from the PRC to the Union

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Table 2

Exports of AHF and ACF from the PRC to the Union

tonnes CN code 2011 2012 2013 Investigation period
Volume 7607 11 90 18 786 17 177 22 444 24 760
Volume 7607 11 20 4 730 3 915 6 826 8 172
Volume Total 23 515 21 091 29 270 32 932
Source: Goodwill China Business Information Ltd.

(78) It should be noted that the Chinese codes in the table above are not specifically for the AHF and ACF is also covered by these codes. The interested parties simply assumed that the total volume exported via these two codes is circumvented AHF, ignoring the fact that the export of genuine ACF is also reported in these codes.

(79) Moreover it is noted that the CN code 7607 11 19 in Eurostat is further broke down into two different codes, one for AHF (7607 11 19 10) and one for ACF (7607 11 19 90). The total imports of ACF from the PRC during the period considered are showed in the table below:

 

Table 3

Imports of ACF from the PRC

tonnes 2011 2012 2013 Investigation period
Volume 25 506 20 996 28 135 36 464
Source: Eurostat.

(80) On the basis of the above, while it is not excluded that some of the imported volumes declared as ACF are indeed circumvented AHF, the interested parties were clearly overstating the volume of the alleged circumvented AHF, as, during the period considered, the total volume of imports of ACF from the PRC was below the alleged circumvented volume of AHF (i.e. 30 000 tonnes), with the exception of the investigation period. Neither the information submitted by the parties nor the information collected by the Commission permit a separation of the allegedly circumvented AHF from the genuine ACF in these codes and, therefore, the Commission is not in a position to assess the volume of circumvented AHF, if any.

(81) Since the parties did not submit any other evidence in support of their claim, it was concluded that the alleged circumventing volumes, if any, were not as such as to break the causal link between the dumped Russian imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry.

 

2.8. Other arguments

(82) The Russian authorities claimed that the Commission has not taken into account the general trend of the declining world market prices of AHF.

(83) As explained in recitals 67, 91, 118 to 120 of the provisional Regulation, the Union prices as well as the import prices from Russia, Turkey, the PRC and other third countries decreased during the period considered. However, the prices of the Russian imports were continuously lower than the Union industry sales prices and undercutting them by [3% — 7%] at significant volumes. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(84) Another interested party claimed that the profitability of the Union industry did not increase because of their expansion of production capacities and the increase in investments.

(85) The production of AHF is machinery intensive. Therefore, in order for the Union industry to increase production capacity, investment in machinery is needed. However, from accounting point of view the impact of the depreciation of the machinery in the total manufacturing cost is limited, between 3% and 5%, and, consequently it cannot have a significant impact on the profitability of the Union industry. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

(86) Following final disclosure, the Russian authorities claimed without supporting evidence that the statistical data from Russia reflect only the average quality of AHF which is a lower-priced product, while the statistics of the Union and the other major third countries reflect a mix of AHF with more expensive foils.

(87) The investigation has not revealed any such difference in quality between the AHF manufactured by the Union producers and the one imported from Russia. The rewinders that are buying AHF from Union producers, from Russia and other third countries producers, especially Turkey, have not raised any claims about a quality difference between the different sourced AHF during the investigation. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(88) Following final disclosure, one interested party also claimed that, in the framework of the current proceeding, the Commission disregarded the fact that four out of the six sampled Union producers alleged injurious dumping on ACF from the PRC.

(89) It is correct that on 12 December 2014 the Commission initiated an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain aluminium foil originating in the People’s Republic of China <*> which is ACF. As explained in recital 30 above, AHF and ACF are two different products, sold in two different markets. The injury suffered by the Union industry from the production and sales of ACF, if any, is not reflected in the situation of the AHF industry. In addition, the investigation on imports of ACF from the PRC was terminated by the Commission without imposition of measures <**>. Specifically, the closed investigation did not lead to any findings by the Commission on whether or not the Union industry is injured by imports of ACF from the PRC. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

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<*> Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain aluminium foil originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ C 444, 12.12.2014, p. 13).

<**> Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2015/1928 of 23 October 2015 terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain aluminium foil originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 281, 27.10.2015, p. 16).

 

(90) Following final disclosure, five rewinders claimed that the Russian AHF competes only marginally with the AHF manufactured by the sampled Union producers. It was further claimed that the Russian AHF competes with the AHF imported from Turkey and the PRC.

(91) This claim was not substantiated by evidence and was therefore rejected.

(92) The rewinders also argued that, in general, the majority of the sampled Union producers do not sell the AHF to rewinders because it is not AHF for the production of consumer rolls, but ACF sold at a premium with prices close to EUR 3 000 per tonne.

(93) This claim is factually incorrect. First, it should be noted that as stated in table 7 of the provisional Regulation the average selling price of the Union industry was EUR 2 597 per tonne during the investigation period and not EUR 3 000 as claimed. Moreover, the investigation confirmed that all sampled Union producers were selling AHF to rewinders. The four rewinders that cooperated in the investigation and submitted a questionnaire reply were buying AHF from the Union producers. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

(94) The five rewinders also argued that the sampled Union producer that only produced AHF has in fact caused material injury to the other sampled Union producers as its selling prices undercut those of the other sampled Union producers. In addition, it was also claimed that as the profitability of the Union industry is calculated based on the sampled Union producers, i.e. not covering the whole Union industry, the Commission should also limit the market share analysis to the sampled companies only instead of the whole Union industry.

(95) During the period considered the selling prices of the sampled Union producer which produces only AHF were in line with the average prices of the Union industry and were, in certain years, even higher. Therefore, it is factually wrong to claim that prices of this Union producer undercut those of the other sampled Union producers.

(96) Regarding the second part of the claim, the Commission recalls that the injury analysis is carried out at the level of the Union industry within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the basic Regulation as defined in recital 53 of the provisional Regulation. Moreover, as explained in recital 9 of the provisional Regulation, due to a large number of Union producers, sampling was applied in accordance with Article 17 of the basic Regulation. Six companies were sampled representing more than 70% of total Union production. No comments concerning the selection of the sample were received within the deadline and, therefore, the sample was considered representative of the Union industry. In addition, due to the application of sampling, as explained in recital 73 of the provisional Regulation, the Commission distinguished between macroindicators and microindicators. The list of these indicators is showed in recitals 74 and 75 of the provisional Regulation. It follows that profitability is a microindicator and therefore is calculated based on the data of the sampled Union producers, while market share is a macroindicator and it should be calculated relating to the whole Union industry. Both methodologies entitle the Commission to make findings that are as such valid for the whole Union industry.

(97) Therefore, the claims in recitals 94 above were rejected.

 

  1. Conclusion on causation

 

(98) None of the arguments submitted by the interested parties demonstrates that the impact of factors other than the dumped import from Russia is such as to break the causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury established. In the light of the foregoing it is concluded that the dumped imports from Russia caused material injury to the Union industry within the meaning of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation.

(99) Therefore, the conclusions set out in in recitals 137 to 141 of the provisional Regulation are hereby confirmed.

 

  1. UNION INTEREST
  1. Interest of the Union industry

 

(100) After provisional disclosure, the Russian authorities claimed that the introduction of measures on imports from Russia would lead to an increase of imports of AHF from other third countries, especially from Turkey and the PRC, and therefore the imposition of the anti-dumping measures with regard to the imports from Russia is not in the interest of the Union industry.

(101) As laid out in recital 147 of the provisional Regulation, anti-dumping measures should restore the level playing field in the Union to enable the Union industry to compete at fair prices on the Union market with imports from other third countries, including Russia, the PRC and Turkey. The fact that other third countries increase their imports is as such not an indication that the Union industry will not be able to benefit from the anti-dumping measures imposed. Indeed, the Union industry is expected to increase sales volume and market share and to raise its selling prices to profitable levels.

(102) The anti-dumping measures in place against the PRC should ensure that Chinese imports enter the Union market at fair price levels, while Turkish price levels were already during the period considered at the same level as the Union industry’s sales prices and did not exert price pressure on the market.

(103) The Commission considers that this argument does not rebut the presumption established by Article 21 of the basic Regulation in favour of the imposition of measures and the need to eliminate the trade distorting effects of the Russian dumped imports and to restore the level playing field.

(104) Therefore, these claims were rejected.

(105) In the absence of any other comments regarding the interest of the Union industry, the conclusion in recital 149 of the provisional Regulation is confirmed.

 

  1. Interest of importers/traders

 

(106) In the absence of any comments regarding the interest of unrelated importers and traders, the conclusion reached in recital 150 of the provisional Regulation is confirmed.

 

  1. Interest of users

 

(107) Following provisional disclosure and final disclosure several users (rewinders producing so called «consumer rolls») reiterated their claims submitted prior to the imposition of provisional measures, however, without providing any new evidence.

(108) One rewinder claimed in particular that anti-dumping duties will have a significant impact on its profitability as it will not be able to pass the duty on to its customers.

(109) This claim was not substantiated. In addition, based on the figures provided by this rewinder, the investigation showed that even if the rewinder is not able to pass on the duty to its customer, it would still remain profitable.

(110) Furthermore, the investigation showed that the «mark-up» added by the rewinders on top of the purchase price of AHF can significantly vary, that is between 5% and 70%, depending on the rewinders’ selling strategy. As outlined in recital 154 of the provisional Regulation, the activity of those rewinders importing AHF from Russia only represented less than one sixth to a maximum of one fourth of their total activity. Furthermore, as outlined in recital 155 of the provisional Regulation, all cooperating companies were overall profitable.

(111) After final disclosure one party claimed that the rewinders do not add any «mark-up» to the purchase price and that the 5% to 70% «mark-up» on the purchase price as established by the Commission in recital 110 above does not reflect the rewinders’ operation and their profitability.

(112) It is recalled that the activity of the rewinders consists in rewinding the aluminium foils from a jumbo roll into a smaller roll for consumers. The rewinders do not alter the chemical properties of the aluminium foil. The «markup» referred to in recital 110 was calculated by comparing the purchase price of aluminium foil in jumbo rolls with the selling price of aluminium foils in the consumer rolls for the cooperating rewinders. The rewinders incur costs during the repackaging operation, however, these costs are low as the main cost driver is the cost of aluminium foil which represents around 80% of the total manufacturing costs. The SG&A expenses vary significantly from one rewinder to the other depending on the rewinders’ selling strategy. Therefore, it is correct that the «mark-up» does not indicate the operation and the profitability of the company, but shows that the level of SG&A expenses has a significant impact on the profitability of the rewinders.

(113) It was also claimed that in the analysis of the situation of the rewinders industry, the Commission did not take into consideration the imports of the downstream product, i.e. consumer rolls from other third countries such as Turkey, Norway, Switzerland, India and Malaysia which substituted the decrease in imports of AHF from the RPC. However, the party did not provide any evidence of the impact of these imports on the situation of the rewinders industry.

(114) As explained in recital 162 of the provisional Regulation, anti-dumping measures on imports of consumer rolls from the PRC were imposed in 2013 which has given the downstream industry a relieve from dumped imports causing material injury. The table below shows the evolution of imports of consumer rolls following the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of consumer rolls from the PRC for the countries mentioned by the party:

 

Table 4

Volumes of import of consumer rolls (tonnes)

2013 Investigation period
the PRC 4 317,60 3 776,10
India 672,70 847,10
Malaysia 605,30 752,10
Norway 2 866,20 324,60
Switzerland 22,00 30,50
Turkey 2 059,80 2 498,80
Total 6 226,0 4 453,10
Source: Eurostat.

(115) The volume of imports from the PRC was 12 994 tonnes during the investigation period of the original anti-dumping investigation on imports of consumer rolls from the PRC (see table 2 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 833/2012 <*>). After the imposition of measures, the volume of imports of consumer rolls from the PRC decreased by 8 676 tonnes in 2013 (that is to 4 317,60 tonnes) and by 9 218 tonnes in the investigation period of the current investigation (that is to 3 776,10 tonnes). The volume of this decrease is higher than the total volume of imports of consumer rolls from the five countries mentioned by the rewinder and set out in table 4 above (by 28% in 2013 and by 52% in the investigation period). Therefore the claim that the imports from the above mentioned countries substituted the decrease of imports from the PRC is unfounded and was rejected.

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<*> Commission Regulation (EU) No 833/2012 of 17 September 2012 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of certain aluminium foils in rolls originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ L 251, 18.9.2012, p. 29).

 

(116) Following final disclosure, several rewinders claimed that on average the rewinders’ activity incorporating AHF represents a higher part in their total activity than what the Commission stated in recital 154 of the provisional Regulation. This claim was based on data provided by two users which did not cooperate in the investigation. It was therefore argued that the Commission should not downplay the importance of the AHF in the rewinders’ cost of production.

(117) In this regard it should be noted that the Commission’s findings in recital 154 of the provisional Regulation are based on the verified data of the cooperating rewinders and thus reflecting their actual situation. The above mentioned additional information was provided only after the final disclosure and thus, at such late stage in the proceeding, it could not be verified anymore. Therefore, it was rejected.

(118) Following final disclosure, two rewinders claimed that the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from Russia will have a negative effect on their profitability.

(119) These two rewinders have not come forward during the investigation until after final disclosure and only one of them submitted a questionnaire reply at this very late stage of the proceeding. Therefore, the Commission could not verify this new information. On this basis, the Commission is not in the position to assess the level of their profitability and the impact of the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from Russia on their profitability. Therefore, their claim was rejected.

(120) Following final disclosure, five rewinders claimed that they will not be able to pass on the cost of the antidumping duty to the consumers due to the following reasons: (1) they sell based on contractual arrangements and the prices are based on the formula linked to the LME aluminium price; (2) due to the price pressure and competition resulting from consumer rolls made with AHF allegedly being circumvented from the PRC, they cannot negotiate a price increase for consumer rolls on the Union market and (3) even if at present the imports into the Union of consumer rolls from third countries is low, it is likely that they will increase in the future.

(121) The investigation has shown that even though the rewinders are not able to pass on the anti-dumping duty to the consumers, the effect on the imposition of the anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from Russia on rewinders will be limited. The investigation has also shown that there are two types of rewinders on the market: one category of rewinders that sell branded consumer rolls and have significant SG&A expenses, and one category of rewinders that sell non-branded consumer rolls with low SG&A expenses. The investigation further revealed that the cooperating rewinders with low SG&A expenses will likely remain profitable after the imposition of the anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from Russia assuming that also the prices of the Union industry will increase by 5% in order for the Union industry to reach the target profit. The cooperating rewinders that sell branded consumer rolls have high «mark-ups» and high SG&A expenses. Therefore, it was considered that they have the ability to absorb the duty.

(122) In the absence of any other comments regarding the interest of users, recitals 151 to 163 of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

 

  1. Sources of supply

 

(123) Following provisional disclosure, several rewinders reiterated their claims submitted prior to the imposition of provisional measures concerning the shortage of supply without, however, providing any new evidence in this respect.

(124) Firstly, the purpose of the anti-dumping measures is not to exclude imports from Russia from the Union market, but to establish a level playing field on the Union market. Therefore, the rewinders will still be able to import AHF from Russia after the imposition of the anti-dumping measures, however at fair price levels. In addition, it is recalled that the anti-dumping measure is set at the level of the injury margin, which is below the dumping margin, and therefore, the imports from Russia will still be possible to arrive on the Union market at a dumped, albeit non-injurious price.

(125) It was claimed that the South Africa and India cannot be considered as an alternative source of supply capable of substituting the imports from Russia as import volumes from these countries were very low.

(126) It is correct that the imports from South Africa and India were low throughout the period considered as compared to the imports from Russia, however, this does not exclude the possibility that these countries will increase their exports to the Union market once the level playing field is restored.

(127) It was also claimed that the Union producers of AHF would increase their production to ACF in light of the allegedly higher margins obtained on the ACF market as compared to AHF, rather than increase capacity and production of AHF.

(128) As explained in recitals 30 and 62 above, the investigation showed that the Union industry is interested to continue to produce AHF, and that in any event only has limited flexibility in switching from the production of AHF to ACF and vice versa. Finally, it is also recalled that the largest Union producer of AHF did not produce ACF. Therefore this claim was rejected.

(129) Following final disclosure, several rewinders claimed on the basis of the information submitted only in confidence that no available production capacity exists in the Union and Turkey. It was also claimed that following the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from Armenia, the Armenian producer, with a production capacity of 25 000 tonnes per year, reoriented its exports to the US market. In addition, the party claimed that considering that the prices of AHF on the Union market will remain low due to the circumvention of the anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from the PRC, it is unlikely that the Armenian producer will divert its exports to the Union market. Furthermore, as concerns Brazil, the rewinders referred to the parallel anti-dumping investigation on imports of AHF from Brazil and the PRC, where the Commission concluded that it was not expected that the Brazilian exports to the Union market would increase significantly in the future. In addition, it was claimed that India and South Africa cannot constitute a reliable and significant source of alternative supply, as the spare capacity for foil production is limited in these countries.

(130) The evidence submitted in confidence was not considered sufficient to conclude that there was not sufficient production capacity available in the Union and Turkey. In fact, the investigation has shown that the Union industry has spare capacity as stated in recital 79 of the provisional Regulation. As concerns the Turkish producers, the investigation also shown that the Turkish producers are interested in the Union market as they increased their volume of sales during the period considered. As the prices on the Union market are likely to reach cost-covering levels after the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from Russia, it is expected that the Turkish producers will continue to find the Union market attractive and possibly redirect part of their production to the Union market.

(131) The anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from Armenia expired on 7 October 2014 <*> and therefore the imports of AHF from Armenia can freely enter the Union market. The claims on the alleged circumvention are addressed in detail in recitals 74 to 81 above. After the imposition of anti-dumping measures on imports of AHF from Russia, it is expected that the prices of the AHF on the Union market will reach cost-covering levels. Therefore, it is not excluded that as a consequence, the Armenian producer will redirect their exports to the Union market.

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<*> Notice of the impending expiry of certain anti-dumping measures, OJ C 49, 21.2.2014, p. 7.

 

(132) As concerns Brazil, the measures were terminated and imports of AHF from Brazil can freely enter the Union market. However, once the prices will reach cost-covering levels on the Union market, it is not excluded that the Brazilian producers will consider the Union market as being more attractive than their domestic and third countries markets and, thus, redirect part of their production to the Union.

(133) As concerns India and South Africa as being considered as an alternative source of supply as stated in recital 165 of the provisional Regulation, firstly is should be noted that the information used in support of the party’s claim did not separate between AHF and ACF. Nevertheless, even if in these countries the spare capacity is low, once the prices on the Union market will reach cost-covering levels it is not excluded that the Union market will become attractive for the Indian and South African producers and they will redirect part of their production to the Union market.

(134) Therefore, the claims stated in recital 129 above were rejected.

(135) In the absence of any other comments recitals 164 to 168 of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

 

  1. Other arguments

 

(136) Following provisional disclosure, one interested party claimed that the definitive measures should be imposed in a least-trade distorting and trade limiting manner without, however further expanding on this claim.

(137) Following final disclosure, this interested party reiterated its claim stated in recital 136 above, however without providing any additional information for its claim.

(138) In this regard, it is highlighted that when deciding on the level of the anti-dumping measures, the Commission is applying the lesser-duty rule in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation and as also outlined in recital 143 below.

(139) In the absence of any other comments recitals 169 to 172 of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

 

  1. Conclusion on Union interest

 

(140) In the absence of any other comments concerning the Union interest, the conclusions reached in recital 173 of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

 

  1. DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
  1. Injury elimination level (Injury margin)

 

(141) Following provisional disclosure, two interested parties contested the target profit used in order to determine the injury elimination level as set out in recitals 175 to 177 of the provisional Regulation. The parties argued that a profit margin of 2% would be a market-tested profit level and should therefore be used instead in order to establish the injury elimination level. However, the claim was not substantiated and therefore it was rejected.

(142) In the absence of any other comments regarding the injury elimination level, the conclusions reached in recitals 175 to 177 of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

 

  1. Definitive measures

 

(143) In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on the imports of the product concerned at the level of the injury margin, in accordance with the lesser duty rule.

(144) After final disclosure, several rewinders claimed that the definitive measures should be imposed in a form of a minimum import price (MIP). The parties suggested that the MIP should be set at the level of a slightly increased profitable price of the producer manufacturing solely AHF. Following the hearing with the Hearing Officer, the parties submitted additional information claiming that the aluminium premium decreased after the investigation period.

(145) In the context of determining whether there is a Union interest as contemplated in Article 21(1) of the basic Regulation, information relating to a period subsequent to the investigation period may be taken into account for those purposes. <*> However, the requirement of such data to be verified and representative for the whole Union industry still applies. As the request for a MIP was made at such a late stage in the proceeding, the Commission did not have the time to send questionnaires to interested parties and organise verification visits. The information submitted by the parties asking for a MIP could not be verified and also was not representative for the whole Union industry. The information submitted indeed indicates an increase of sales prices while the aluminium premium is decreasing, however the Commission cannot draw meaningful conclusions on unverified and non-representative data.

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<*> Judgment of the General Court of 25 October 2011 in case No. T-192/08. Transnational Company «Kazchrome» AO, paragraph 221.

 

(146) In addition, the level of the MIP should be calculated on the basis of the data representative for the whole Union industry and not just on the basis of one single Union producer as was proposed by the users. In addition, the data used for the calculation of a MIP needs to be verified and, as the request for a MIP was made at such a late stage of the proceeding, the Commission was not in the position to collect and verify the necessary data. Therefore, the proposed MIP was considered inappropriate.

(147) In any event, a change of the type of measure would require full disclosure to all interested parties, otherwise it would significantly breach the procedural rights of the Union industry. As this claim was made at such a late stage of the investigation, the Commission did not have the necessary time to make such a disclosure to the interested parties.

(148) In addition, the fact that the exporter sells in the Union via a related trader makes the export prices unreliable.

(149) Therefore, in light of the above it was considered that in this particular case the circumstances are not such as to warrant the imposition of a MIP.

(150) Nevertheless, it should be noted that the rewinders have still the possibility of asking for an interim review in accordance with Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation if the conditions are met.

(151) On the basis of the above, the rate at which such duties will be imposed are set as follows:

Country Company Dumping margin (%) Injury margin (%) Definitive antidumping duty (%)
Russia Ural Foil OJSC, Sverdlovsk region; OJSC Rusal Sayanal, Khakassia region — Rusal Group 34,0 12,2 12,2
All other companies 12,2
  1. Definitive collection of the provisional duties

 

(152) In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected.

 

  1. Undertakings

 

(153) Following the final disclosure Rusal group offered a price undertaking under Article 8(1) of the basic Regulation.

(154) The offer was thoroughly examined by the Commission. It is important to note that Rusal is a complex company group with over 40 plants in 13 countries. In particular, the group includes a related producer in Armenia (Armenal) producing and selling the product concerned to the Union. In view of the relationship between the Russian exporting producers and Armenal, it is likely that these companies will sell the product concerned to the same customers or customers related to one of these customers in the Union. This poses high risk of cross-compensation. In addition, Rusal group operates through very complex sales channels with the involvement of related traders and related agents located both inside and outside Russia. The related trader and the related agent also sell other products to the Union, and these other products represent in fact the majority of the related trader’s turnover. Under these circumstances it cannot be excluded that both product concerned and other products are sold to the same customers. Such transactions would entail a high risk of cross-compensation and in any event would make the monitoring of the undertaking particularly complex.

(155) Based on above it is concluded that the acceptance of the undertaking would be impractical and consequently the undertaking offer has to be rejected.

(156) The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 did not deliver an opinion,

Has adopted this Regulation:

 

Article 1

 

  1. A definitive anti-dumping duty is hereby imposed on imports of aluminium foil of a thickness of not less than 0,008 mm and not more than 0,018 mm, not backed, not further worked than rolled, in rolls of a width not exceeding 650 mm and of a weight exceeding 10 kg, currently falling within CN code ex 7607 11 19 (TARIC code 7607 11 19 10), and originating in Russia.
  2. The rates of the definitive anti-dumping duty applicable to the net, free-at-Union-frontier price, before duty, of the product described in paragraph 1 shall be 12,2%.
  3. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

 

Article 2

 

The amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duties pursuant to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1081 shall be definitively collected.

 

Article 3

 

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

 

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

 

Done at Brussels, 17 December 2015.

For the Commission The President JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER

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